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 Abstract: Many contemporary human rights theorists argue that we 
can establish the normative universality of human rights despite extensive 
cultural and moral diversity by appealing to the notion of overlapping 
consensus. In this paper I argue that proposals to ground the universality of 
human rights in overlapping consensus on the list of rights are unsuccessful. I 
consider an example from Islamic comprehensive doctrine in order to 
demonstrate that apparent consensus on the list of rights may not in fact 
constitute meaningful agreement and may not be sufficient to ground the 
universality of human rights. I conclude with some general suggestions for 
establishing the universality of human rights. Instead of presuming the 
universality of human rights based on apparent overlapping consensus we 
need to construct universality through actual dialogue both within and 
between communities. 
I. Introduction 
The criticism that human rights are not legitimately universal 
but instead reflect political and moral ideologies of western liberal 
democratic states has been waged for decades and continues today. 
One popular strategy adopted by several contemporary human rights 
theorists to address this criticism seeks to preserve the universality of 
human rights while remaining sensitive to local cultural beliefs by 
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incorporating both pluralism and universalism. Theorists who adopt 
this strategy appeal to John Rawls’s notion of overlapping consensus to 
explain how we can have meaningful agreement about human rights 
despite extensive cultural and moral diversity. We can allow for moral 
pluralism regarding justification of a human rights regime and to some 
extent interpretation and implementation of human rights, while 
maintaining that human rights are universal because there is 
widespread cross-cultural consensus on the list of rights, e.g., as 
expressed in the Universal Declaration and other International Human 
Rights Covenants.  
In this paper I argue that while we need to find ways of 
establishing the normative universality of human rights while taking 
seriously moral and cultural diversity, proposals that seek to do this by 
appealing to overlapping consensus on the list of rights are not the 
most promising strategies. Specifically, I argue that comprehensive 
belief systems, which provide justification for human rights, shape 
conceptual understandings of human rights and not just interpretation 
or implementation of rights. Thus, if the various belief systems upon 
which justification of human rights are based are divergent enough or 
incompatible, then widespread agreement on the list does not 
necessarily constitute meaningful agreement and may not be sufficient 
to ground the universality of human rights. I consider an example from 
Islamic comprehensive doctrine in order to demonstrate that apparent 
agreement on the list of rights may not in fact constitute meaningful 
agreement. I conclude with some general alternative suggestions for 
establishing the universality of human rights. Instead of presuming the 
universality of human rights based on apparent overlapping consensus 
we need to construct universality through actual dialogue both within 
and between communities. 
II. Universality as Overlapping Consensus at the 
Level of Concepts 
Proposals to construe the universality of human rights as 
overlapping consensus on the list of rights are quite popular. For 
example, Amy Gutmann argues that a universal human rights regime 
ought to be compatible with a plurality of comprehensive belief 
systems that converge on the content of the list while providing varied 
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religious, social, and cultural justifications for human rights.1 Similarly, 
Jack Donnelly argues that while there may be disagreement at the 
levels of interpretation and implementation, there is arguably universal 
agreement on human rights at the conceptual level.2 Finally, James 
Nickel argues that one way to secure the universality of human rights 
is to establish that there is worldwide acceptance of human rights, and 
that worldwide acceptance requires acceptance of the rights 
themselves, not necessarily acceptance of the same reasons or 
justification for rights.3 In this paper I will focus primarily on the 
proposal Jack Donnelly presents in his recent book, Universal Human 
Rights in Theory and Practice, while noting that my remarks apply to 
any proposal that seeks to establish the universality of human rights 
through overlapping consensus on the list.  
Donnelly states that human rights can be said to be universal in 
at least two ways. First, they are universal in the sense that all human 
beings hold these rights simply in virtue of being human and they hold 
them universally against all other human beings and institutions.4 
Donnelly calls this the moral universality of human rights. Understood 
in this way, human rights are universal in the sense that they have 
humanity as their source. Human nature contains the basis for norms 
regarding what it means to live a dignified human life in the sense that 
the “source of human rights is man’s moral nature.”5  
Donnelly admits that the fact that human rights ultimately 
depend on some prescriptive conception of human nature seems 
initially to pose a problem, for few issues in moral and political 
philosophy are as contested as theories of human nature. The fact that 
there are so many diverse and in some cases incompatible conceptions 
of human nature could pose a problem, for it raises the question of 
whether it is possible to supply persuasive arguments to support a 
single set of human rights norms that are universally valid. Yet, 
Donnelly concludes that such profound diversity does not in fact pose 
a problem. He states: 
If we were faced with an array of competing and contradictory 
lists of human rights clamoring for either philosophical or political 
attention this inability to defend a particular theory of human nature 
might be a serious short-coming. Fortunately, there is remarkable 
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international normative consensus on the list of rights contained in the 
Universal Declaration and in International Human Rights Covenants.6  
This brings us to the second sense in which Donnelly believes 
human rights can be said to be universal, namely, that there is 
universal or near universal agreement on the substantive content of 
the list. Donnelly relies on John Rawls’s notion of overlapping 
consensus to demonstrate how meaningful convergence of diverse 
comprehensive doctrines is possible and can ground the universality of 
human rights. Rawls distinguishes between comprehensive religious, 
moral, or philosophical doctrines and political conceptions of justice. 
Since political conceptions of justice are defined as independently as 
possible from any particular comprehensive doctrine, it is possible for 
people who have varied and perhaps even incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines to nonetheless agree on or reach an 
overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice. Using this 
notion of overlapping consensus, Donnelly argues that justifications for 
human rights can be many and varied, but we can nonetheless 
maintain that human rights are universal because there is overlapping 
consensus on the human rights model and the substantive content of 
the list expressed in the Universal Declaration. This is what Donnelly 
calls the international normative universality of human rights.7  
Donnelly spells out the nature and scope of his particular 
proposal for preserving the universality of human rights and respecting 
local cultural norms by arguing for a position he calls weak cultural 
relativism (WCR). According to WCR, “culture is a secondary source of 
the validity of a right or rule. Universality is initially presumed, but the 
relativity of human nature, communities, and rules, checks potential 
excesses of universalism.”8 Thus, the WCR can recognize a set of 
prima facie universal human rights norms while allowing limited local 
variation. Donnelly characterizes the scope of WCR by distinguishing 
between the levels of concept, interpretation, and implementation and 
then argues for universalism at the level of concepts; at this level, a 
particular human right is an “abstract, general statement of orienting 
value” in which there is substantive though general agreement on 
basic meaning that will limit the range of defensible interpretations.9 
Thus, cultural difference poses no real threat to the normative 
universality of human rights. For though there may be a good deal of 
cultural variability at the level of implementation, and perhaps even 
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some at the level of interpretation, there is universal or near universal 
agreement at the level of concepts; that is, there is near universal 
agreement on the substantive content of the list and this, Donnelly 
and others believe, is sufficient to ground the normative universality of 
human rights.  
Of course human rights will not be compatible with all 
comprehensive doctrines, though this is itself not a problem. After all, 
it is the point of human rights norms that they discriminate between 
legitimate and illegitimate practices and actions, in particular those 
that are just and unjust. The range of acceptable comprehensive 
doctrines is set by phrases like “these rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person” or “all human rights derive from the 
dignity and worth inherent in the human person” that appear in 
various human rights declarations and documents.10 Thus, Donnelly 
states that participation “in the overlapping consensus on the 
Universal Declaration model is (only) possible for those who see 
“human being” as a fundamental moral category and who see human 
beings as in some important sense autonomous actors.”11 Human 
rights will be incompatible with comprehensive doctrines that are 
fundamentally inegalitarian, in particular those that do not see “human 
being” as a fundamental moral category. Nonetheless, Donnelly 
believes that the “basic moral equality of all human beings is not 
merely accepted but strongly endorsed by all leading comprehensive 
doctrines in all regions of the world” and that this “convergence on 
egalitarian comprehensive doctrines, both within and between 
civilizations, provides the foundation for a convergence on the rights of 
the Universal Declaration.”12  
III. The Non-Modularity of Moral Knowledge: 
Implications for Overlapping Consensus 
While I agree that we need to find some way of establishing the 
universal validity of human rights, proposals like WCR may not be the 
most viable way to do this. Specifically, any proposal to ground the 
universality of human rights in overlapping consensus at the level of 
concepts rests on suspect epistemological underpinnings regarding the 
nature of moral knowledge. Drawing from the work of Margaret 
Walker, I will explain briefly what this faulty view of moral knowledge 
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is, why it is problematic, and the ways in which proposals like WCR 
depend on it.  
In her book Moral Understandings, Margaret Urban Walker 
argues against a model of morality, accepted in much western analytic 
ethics, that she calls the theoretical-juridical model.13 The theoretical-
juridical model is not a type of normative moral theory, but expresses 
a general approach to moral theorizing that many, otherwise quite 
disparate, normative moral theories share. One feature of this model 
that Walker rejects is its tendency to assume that moral knowledge 
consists of a pure core or compact set of beliefs that can be detached 
from the particularities of any specific way of life and that differences 
across cultures merely represent different applications of this same 
core.14 Against this view, Walker argues that moral knowledge is not 
conceptually modular, that what we know and what we can know 
about morality cannot be detached from whatever other beliefs, both 
moral and non-moral, we have about the world, in particular those 
that constitute the social life of the respective ways of life we inhabit. 
Moral understandings are not only intimately bound up with other 
social understandings but are effected through them. This means that 
other social and cultural understandings frame or give shape to the 
meanings of moral concepts and principles. Accordingly, in 
“differentiated moral-social worlds … ‘we’ may participate in different 
practices that support different moral concepts or may participate in 
practices whose differences give the same moral terms different 
meanings.”15 I call Walker’s view the non-modularity thesis of moral 
knowledge.  
Walker provides the following example in order to illustrate the 
non-modularity thesis. While it may seem that the Golden Rule, “Do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you,” has an intuitive 
egalitarian content that everyone can grasp equally well, in a context 
“that does not already provide some patterns of universal egalitarian 
thinking it may well only make sense in such ways as ‘Do unto others 
what is appropriate to their station as you would have done to you 
what is appropriate to yours.’”16 Those of us in communities that 
already have “patterns of universal egalitarian thinking” take for 
granted the “typical” egalitarian interpretation of the Golden Rule as 
obvious if not self-evident. Yet, for such an interpretation to seem so 
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obvious and so reasonable requires that we hold a certain number of 
other beliefs within which this interpretation makes sense.  
At this point someone might worry that the non-modularity 
thesis entails radical incommensurability of moral concepts or 
principles. Our ability to effectively communicate with and understand 
those whose shared life is shaped by comprehensive doctrines that are 
very different from our own presupposes that at some level there is 
shared meaning that fixes the concept or principle in question. If 
radically different comprehensive doctrines give what appear to be the 
same moral terms radically different meanings, then perhaps members 
of these different communities are not in fact using the same moral 
terms after all. If so, then we have no basis for comparison, no shared 
terms on which meaningful dialogue can proceed.  
While the non-modularity thesis does not entail radical 
incommensurability, the thesis does suggest that conceptual meaning 
is complex and multi-layered. It may be true that we can identify 
some bare, substantively thin meaning that fixes a particular concept 
or term and on which many comprehensive doctrines seem to 
converge. Yet, this meaning is likely to be so thin that agreement at 
this level is vacuous or practically trivial. The non-modularity thesis 
entails that when we make moral terms or principles substantive or 
thick enough to be action-guiding, we inevitably build in substantive 
premises or assumptions that attach to the moral-social worlds we 
inhabit and the comprehensive doctrines that shape these worlds.  
Michael Walzer makes a similar point when he discusses the 
relationship between minimal and maximal moralities in his book Thick 
and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad.17 When from a 
distance we watch protestors in Prague demanding ‘truth’ and ‘justice’ 
from their political leaders there is a sense in which we see something 
that we recognize. There is a minimal, thin meaning of these terms 
that allows us to identify these concepts as familiar; they are not 
wholly foreign. Yet, the minute we provide a more substantive account 
of justice or attempt to establish action-guiding norms or principles for 
how to best meet the demands of justice, we inevitably build in 
premises and assumptions that attach to our own maximal or “thick” 
moralities. When this happens it is not clear that members of different 
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communities actually agree about what ‘justice’ is even though there is 
a minimal sense in which we are using the same moral term.18  
Thus, the non-modularity of moral knowledge does not entail 
radical incommensurability of the sort that makes moral dialogue 
across diverse cultural contexts impossible. Indeed, thin meaning may 
provide that point of contact and shared epistemic turf upon which 
dialogue and discussion can begin. Instead, the non-modularity of 
moral knowledge suggests that we cannot presume to have the kind of 
meaningful agreement required to ground the normative universality 
of human rights simply because many of “us” accept the same general 
moral norms or concepts. We cannot assume that overlapping 
consensus on the list of rights indicates the kind of meaningful, 
substantive agreement required for us to say with some confidence 
that there is universal acceptance of human rights as action-guiding 
norms for cross-cultural moral evaluation and critique.  
Proposals such as WCR that try to ground the universality of 
human rights in overlapping consensus at the level of concepts rely on 
the view that moral knowledge is conceptually modular. They assume 
that we can identify a core set of concepts that, while not empty, is 
substantively thin enough such that many people who hold otherwise 
quite disparate comprehensive doctrines can nonetheless meaningfully 
accept this same core. Overlapping consensus at the level of concepts 
is possible precisely because human rights are believed to consist in a 
general, substantively thin core of moral knowledge that can be 
detached from the particularities of any specific comprehensive 
doctrine and thus be made compatible with many (though not all). 
Moreover, variations across cultures are simply expressed as different 
applications of this same core set of concepts. This is what Donnelly 
means when he says that we can allow cultural norms to influence 
implementation and, to some extent, interpretation of particular 
human rights, while nonetheless maintaining that human rights are 
universal. We all agree on the same core, the same concepts; cultural 
norms can influence different applications (implementations) of this 
core.  
Yet, if the non-modularity thesis is correct then agreement at 
the level of concepts will not necessarily constitute meaningful 
agreement and may be insufficient to ground the universality of 
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human rights. The non-modularity of moral knowledge entails that 
comprehensive belief systems, which provide justification for human 
rights, shape to some degree our conceptual understandings of human 
rights and not just our interpretation and implementation of them. The 
non-modularity thesis denies that we can make the kind of sharp 
distinction between concepts and justifications that Donnelly and 
others want to make in order to preserve both the universality of 
human rights and respect for local cultural norms.  
Donnelly admits that consensus is substantive and not merely 
procedural, for only those who believe in the fundamental moral 
equality of all human beings will agree to human rights norms. Yet, 
this general principle still needs to be given meaning and different 
comprehensive belief systems may support different meanings, 
differences which may reveal that agreement on general norms does 
not actually constitute meaningful agreement. This is what Walker 
means when she says that “we” may inhabit different moral-social 
practices that either support different concepts or give different 
meanings to the same concepts.19  
I do not mean to argue that overlapping consensus at the level 
of concepts is not possible, or that it does not in fact happen. Rather, I 
wish to caution that in order for overlapping consensus to constitute 
meaningful agreement, those of us who agree must hold 
comprehensive doctrines that are similar enough or in the right ways 
such that they support similar conceptual understandings. In the 
global arena, the variety of comprehensive doctrines that people from 
different communities hold may or may not be similar enough or in the 
right ways to support conceptual understandings of human rights 
norms that are similar enough to establish genuine agreement on the 
list. At the very least we cannot assume that they are similar enough 
simply because people seem to accept the same general norms or 
concepts. 
IV. Islamic Comprehensive Doctrine 
In order to make this point clearer and more concrete, I’d like to 
consider an example from Islamic comprehensive doctrine. Many 
contemporary Islamic scholars have taken great pains to demonstrate 
that comprehensive religious doctrines of Islam support the 
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fundamental moral and intellectual equality of all human beings. For 
example, Maysam al-Faruqi explains that the comprehensive doctrines 
that unify Muslim belief and practice are rooted in the Quran and that 
the worldview of the Quran is committed to the fundamental moral 
and intellectual equality of all human beings.20 The Quranic creation 
stories explain that the sole purpose of all of creation is to worship 
God; human beings have been charged with the special task of being 
God’s representatives or vicergents on earth. As such, human beings 
are charged with following God’s instructions for how to live and, 
importantly, these instructions are to be carried out by each individual 
regardless of gender or race. Faruqi emphasizes the absence of gender 
distinctions when the Quran speaks of the creation and purpose of 
human beings. She states: 
The rights to own property, to get an education, to work, to 
marry, to divorce are all granted equally in the Quran and 
clearly practiced as such during the life of the Prophet. Nowhere 
does the Quran affirm a difference based on race or gender in 
the endowment of intelligence, ethics, talents, or anything 
needed to carry out the vice-gerency and that is consistent with 
the absolute transcendence and the absolute justice of God.21  
Faruqi’s claims resonate with the extensive exegetical work of 
scholars such as Amina Wadud who challenges traditional 
interpretations of the Quran that deny the fundamental moral and 
intellectual equality of all human beings.22 Similarly, Fatima Mernissi 
has argued against the misuse of popular hadith reports (officially 
sanctioned written reports specifying what the Prophet did or said on a 
particular occasion with respect to a particular issue) to support the 
view that women are intellectually and morally weak or inferior to 
men, by not only challenging the legitimacy of these hadith, but also 
by reexamining the role of women in the Muslim community during the 
time of the Prophet.23 Given the work of these and other Islamic 
scholars there is clearly a sense in which Islamic comprehensive 
religious doctrines are fundamentally egalitarian in the sense required 
by Donnelly and others for overlapping consensus on the list of human 
rights. The Quran grants moral and intellectual equality to all human 
beings regardless of gender or race and in this sense the Quran 
recognizes “human being” as a fundamental moral category.  
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Yet, Faruqi notes that when we move to the socio-economic 
order, to the realm of family and property, things begin to look a bit 
different as “the Quran clearly differentiates between the rights and 
obligations of the two sexes.”24 The worldview expressed in the Quran 
is one that seeks to establish a social order based on interdependence 
and partnership. Yet, it takes the family rather than the individual as 
the locus of this social order. Accordingly, the Quran then assigns 
different rights and obligations to different family members based on 
sex and age. The goal of these assignments is to establish a 
fundamentally egalitarian social order and to maintain equal justice for 
all. Yet, because the Quran takes the family unit rather than the 
individual as primary at the socio-economic level, it does not assign 
rights and obligations on the basis of the kind of blind equality that the 
Universal Declaration presupposes. Indeed, Faruqi notes that there is 
no notion of blind equality in the Quran.25  
For example, taking the family as the primary social unit, and 
recognizing the tremendous effort and toil that the mother experiences 
having to carrying the child, nurse the child, and fulfill the child’s 
immediate needs as an infant, the Quran assigns obligations to fathers 
and brothers to bear financial burdens of family life. Faruqi states: 
“The mother then already contributes a substantial share at the 
physiological level. In the egalitarian system of the Quran, the father 
must, therefore, face an equal obligation because the mother already 
faces obligations set by biological laws.”26 The Quran assigns to the 
father the responsibility of providing for mother and child financially, 
because the mother should never have to shoulder financial burdens in 
addition to the other physical burdens she faces. Moreover, the notion 
of family central to Islamic moral understandings is not merely the 
nuclear family but also the extended family for if the father cannot 
meet his responsibilities, the Quran charges the extended family with 
doing so. Thus, it may seem that the Quran discriminates against 
women when, for example, it establishes the right of a brother to 
receive twice the inheritance of his sister. Yet, when we understand 
this assignment of rights within the context of a Quranic socio-
economic order we can see that the “inheritance system follows the 
distribution of responsibilities within the family cell” and is designed to 
ensure equal justice for all.27  
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The point of exploring Faruqi’s particular discussion of this 
aspect of Islamic comprehensive doctrine is to demonstrate the ways 
in which comprehensive doctrines give shape and meaning to 
concepts, in this case to the concept of equality. The non-modularity 
thesis entails that who “we” are may generate and support different 
understandings of the concept of equality. For example, even if “we” 
all accept the general moral norm expressed by Article 16 of the 
Universal Declaration, that all human beings are entitled to equal 
rights in marriage, many of “us” may have very different 
understandings of what this entails because our respective 
comprehensive doctrines support different conceptual understandings 
of the notion of equality. The kind of blind equality that the Universal 
Declaration presumes when assigning rights to individual human 
beings without reference to sex, race, creed, or nationality, is one way 
to understand the notion of equality. Yet, this conceptual 
understanding of ‘equality’ depends crucially on certain other social 
and cultural understandings that attach to particular comprehensive 
doctrines, doctrines that for example posit the individual as the 
primary social unit. Other comprehensive doctrines that do not take 
the individual as primary, but instead take the family as the basic 
social unit, may support different understandings of the notion of 
equality such that we do not actually agree even if we seem to accept 
the same general norm that people deserve equal rights in marriage.28  
Someone might object at this point that equality rights are 
notoriously contested and controversial and that the non-modularity of 
moral knowledge seems less of a problem for security rights such as 
the right not to be tortured.29 Yet, even if “we” all agree that 
individuals have a right not to be tortured, it is not clear that we have 
achieved meaningful agreement until we know how our different 
comprehensive doctrines influence our conceptual understandings of 
‘torture’ including what counts as torture, the nature of the violation 
that has occurred, and how cases of torture should be addressed. For 
example, many believe that practices of female genital cutting are 
obvious examples of torture that the international community has an 
obligation to address. Yet, even if there is fairly wide-spread 
agreement that this practice counts as torture (and it is not obvious 
that there is), it is not yet clear that the human rights framework 
provides an adequate definition of the problem as a violation of human 
dignity based on the blind equality of individuals.30 The recent sexual 
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abuse of Iraqi prisoners raises similar issues. Sexual abuse is a 
violation of human dignity, but Islamic comprehensive doctrine may 
support a particular understanding of this violation that is not 
adequately captured by mere reference to a human rights framework 
that leaves out any reference to religion.31  
I do not mean to preclude the possibility that there exist 
inconsistencies or contradictions among or within the various and 
competing translations and interpretations of the Quran and other 
sources that constitute Islamic comprehensive doctrine. Yet, this is not 
itself a fatal flaw; rather it is a characteristic feature of any lived 
morality. After all, the professed “equality of all human beings” has co-
existed with the formal denial of the full equality of non-whites and 
women in Western, liberal, democratic communities. Rather than 
reject liberalism or certain forms of democracy because of such 
inconsistencies, members of these moral communities have made 
moral progress by reinterpreting what a commitment to equality in 
liberal societies entails.32  
The comprehensive doctrines that shape shared life are not 
fixed, rigid sets of principles or codes, but are on-going interpretations 
and formulations of traditions, texts, values, and ideals. No community 
is homogenous and shared understandings are always contested. It is 
precisely within the existing tensions and inconsistencies where 
arguments and debates about who “we” are, what “we” value, and 
what are the best interpretations of the understandings that shape our 
shared life can occur. 
V. Consensus Based On the “Universal” Threats of 
Modern States and Markets 
At this point, someone might object further that the non-
modularity of moral knowledge coupled with extensive diversity among 
comprehensive doctrines is still not a problem for meaningful 
agreement on human rights norms. Numerous scholars point out that 
overlapping consensus on the list of human rights has become so 
wide-spread and is meaningful enough to have normative force 
because human rights are a construct designed to counter threats 
posed by the rise of modern states and markets, a threat to which we 
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are all now vulnerable.33 Agreement on human rights is agreement on 
political norms and insofar as we are all now using modern political 
institutions, we can agree on human rights as the known remedies to 
safeguard against likely abuses by those institutions, despite our other 
moral and political differences. Thus, meaningful agreement can be 
established now because of the historical fact that we are all now using 
modern political institutions.  
Jim Nickel provides a very helpful analogy to make this point 
clearer: the modern state is like a rotary lawnmower. A rotary 
lawnmower is a device for cutting grass that has very sharp blades 
parallel to the ground that can injure the operator’s feet if she gets too 
close, a danger which is inherent in the device and is realized 
everywhere the device is used. If people everywhere think cut up feet 
are a bad thing, and if people in all countries are going to use rotary 
lawnmowers, then both the dangers inherent in the device and known 
remedies for protecting against these dangers need to be learned 
everywhere. The modern state is similar to the rotary lawnmower in 
that it has certain built-in dangers that are a threat to all who use it. 
Human rights norms are known remedies for protecting against the 
dangers posed by the modern state.34 Thus, despite extensive cultural 
and moral diversity, insofar as we are all using modern political and 
economic institutions and are vulnerable to the dangers inherent in 
such institutions, we can achieve overlapping consensus on human 
rights as the set of remedies to protect us from such dangers.  
The point of drawing any analogy is to highlight and clarify a 
particular feature of an entity or process, and Nickel’s analogy is 
helpful in highlighting those violations or threats to human dignity 
posed by certain systematic deficiencies of modern political and 
economic institutions.35 Nickel concedes that not all of the problems 
human rights address derive from abuses of political institutions, and 
that consensus may be more controversial on those rights that deal 
with social issues, such as equality rights. Moreover, he notes that we 
need a view of rights that is broader than merely focusing on problems 
caused by modern political institutions.36 Yet, since so many human 
rights theorists appeal to the universality of modern political and 
economic institutions as a historical condition that makes overlapping 
consensus on human rights plausible and effective, I think it is worth 
pointing out the limitations of such an approach.  
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Focusing on human rights as a response to “the” dangers posed 
by modern political and economic institutions simply shifts the problem 
of the non-modularity of moral knowledge, for it still assumes that we 
can isolate a pure core of moral knowledge that is applicable to all. In 
this case, the pure core is “the” effects of modern states and markets, 
which can be divorced from the particularities of comprehensive 
doctrines. Yet, the effects of modern states and markets are not 
experienced everywhere in the same way precisely because of the 
ways in which these institutions interact with already existing 
comprehensive doctrines. Though the rise of modern states and 
markets may now be a global phenomenon, i.e., though we may all be 
using rotary lawnmowers, we are cutting different kinds of grass, with 
different kinds of blades, which may present different kinds of dangers 
that are more or less strongly felt in different places. The effects of 
processes of modernization are not experienced in the same way by all 
people everywhere because these processes are one variable among 
many that intersect in complex ways to create the multifaceted and 
complex oppressive situations that people in different places find 
themselves in.37  
Donnelly spends a good deal of time arguing that even though 
the current human rights model originated in “the West” this “tells us 
absolutely nothing about the “applicability,” “relevance,” 
“appropriateness,” or “value” of these ideas … either inside or outside 
the West.”38 We do not assume that gun powder is applicable only in 
China simply because it was invented there; we should not make the 
same mistake regarding human rights.39 I agree with Donnelly that the 
Western origins of the current human rights model do not necessarily 
make human rights irrelevant to other cultures. Yet, modern political 
institutions do not exist in a vacuum. Their effects cannot be easily 
isolated from the other social and cultural practices and beliefs they 
interact with in particular places to generate the complex threats to 
human dignity that people experience, threats that have many 
sources. Thus, we cannot assume that “our” particular experiences of 
the dangerous effects of modern political and economic institutions 
represent “the” inherent dangers in the device. We can acknowledge 
what we think we know about some of the dangers of modern political 
and economic institutions based on our experiences of their effects 
thus far, but we also will need to actually examine what effects such 
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institutions have in other places as they interact with other local 
customs, practices, and frameworks. 
VI. Navigating Our Way between Universalism 
and Relativism: Constructing Consensus 
Thus far I have shown why conventional strategies for 
grounding the normative universality of human rights in overlapping 
consensus may not be the most viable strategies for achieving the kind 
of meaningful consensus required in order for us to say with some 
confidence that human rights are universally valid. Yet, this does not 
mean that we need to abandon a human rights approach altogether. 
In the case of Islam, Maysam Al-Faruqi recommends that the 
definitions of the problems Muslim women face must come from within 
an Islamic framework and that Islam alone will provide the solutions.40 
Though her points need to be taken very seriously, her proposal seems 
problematic for the same reasons that WCR does: it isolates and 
emphasizes only one variable among many that give shape to the 
various forms of oppression that Muslim women face. Insofar as her 
approach ignores the very real influences of processes of 
modernization and the ways these interact with already existing 
religious frameworks, it too will be insufficient to adequately define 
and address these problems. What we need are more contextualized, 
empirically informed strategies to better understand the kinds of 
violations that are occurring in different places and to identify the 
multiple sources of these violations in order to know how best to 
address them and if human rights are an appropriate part of the 
solution.  
Drawing from the work of Abdullahi An-Na’im, I conclude with 
some extremely general suggestions for how we might proceed in 
establishing the universality of human rights. An-Na’im suggests that 
the “universality of human rights should be seen as a product of a 
process rather than as an established “given” concept and specific 
predetermined normative content to be discovered or proclaimed 
through international declarations and rendered legally binding 
through treaties.”41 Instead of presuming consensus, we should 
attempt to construct an overlapping consensus on the meaning and 
implications of universal human rights through internal discourse 
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within cultures and cross-cultural dialogue among them. Discourse 
aimed at constructing consensus needs to be as inclusive as possible, 
representing as many diverse views as possible, for the meanings and 
interpretations of comprehensive doctrines are contested.  
Human rights advocates should use whatever arguments are 
likely to be persuasive to the members of a specific community or 
whatever means necessary to address their apprehensions and 
concerns, in relation to whatever frame of reference is accepted by 
that community as authoritative or applicable. This means that we 
cannot ignore the religious, moral, or philosophical frameworks that 
people in particular communities take as authoritative, nor can we 
merely allow them to influence implementation of rights; rather we 
need to engage these frameworks and pay attention to the nuances 
and complexities of comprehensive doctrines in order to figure out 
what conceptual understandings they in fact do support.  
This approach does not preclude pointing out existing 
inconsistencies or contradictions within Islamic or any other 
comprehensive doctrine. Nor does this approach necessarily prohibit 
pointing out flaws or contradictions so great they prove to be fatal, 
rendering a particular worldview or framework unstable or 
insupportable. Yet, too often theorists presume to have identified 
inconsistencies or contradictions without really understanding the 
comprehensive doctrine in question. In practice I think it will rarely be 
the case that we find flaws so fatal they warrant rejecting a 
comprehensive doctrine and the way of life it supports in its entirety. 
It is more often the case that particular beliefs or understandings need 
reforming or reformulating; in order to know whether this is the case, 
and in order to do the reinterpretive work, we need to engage in actual 
dialogue with those who live by the comprehensive doctrine in 
question.42  
An-Na’im’s proposal for grounding the universality of human 
rights in overlapping consensus differs from more conventional appeals 
to overlapping consensus in at least three important respects. First, 
instead of presuming that any comprehensive doctrine that is 
fundamentally egalitarian will be compatible with and support the list 
of human rights, An-Na’im requires that we construct consensus 
through actual dialogue both between and within communities. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Social Philosophy Today, Vol. 21, (2005): pg. 33-50. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
18 
 
Second, instead of trying to isolate “the” threats of modern states and 
markets and construe human rights as remedies to these threats, An-
Na’im stresses the importance of being attentive to the ways in which 
processes of modernization intersect with comprehensive doctrines 
and other local, regional, and global factors to create complex forms of 
oppression that have many sources. Third, instead of pointing to the 
fact that representatives from many different countries (primarily 
political leaders) have signed onto the Universal Declaration and other 
International Human Rights Covenants as evidence that human rights 
are increasingly universally supported, An-Na’im’s account requires 
that dialogue for constructing consensus be as inclusive as possible 
representing as many diverse views as possible (not just the views of 
political elites).  
My remarks against appeals to overlapping consensus as a 
viable strategy (to secure the universality of human rights while 
remaining sensitive to moral and cultural diversity) do not entail that 
we should reject this strategy altogether. Rather, they suggest that we 
need to rethink the way we employ it. Theorists have typically simply 
presumed overlapping consensus on the list of rights among 
comprehensive doctrines that support the fundamental equality of all 
human beings. This is a presumption that we cannot rightfully make, 
for we cannot know if we have the kind of meaningful agreement 
necessary to establish human rights as universally accepted until we 
know what conceptual understandings of particular rights various 
comprehensive doctrines actually support. We must take relativist 
worries more seriously than simply allowing for local cultural variation 
to influence the implementation of human rights norms. We begin to 
take relativist worries seriously by first acknowledging the difficulty of 
establishing universally valid and applicable norms, and then by 
working with and within the frameworks and worldviews that people 
already take as authoritative. We need deeply contextual knowledge of 
local customs, traditions, beliefs, and practices, and we need to 
engage with these comprehensive frameworks and doctrines in order 
to construct rather than presume meaningful consensus. This strategy 
is more likely to achieve genuine consensus because it is more likely to 
accurately define the problems people face as the complex problems 
that they are and thus to meet these problems with the multifaceted 
solutions they require. How we go about doing this is a complicated 
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matter, but this only reflects the complexity of the world we live in and 
the increasingly global relationships we engage in.43  
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